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WNCN Listeners Guild
and Citizens Communications Center v. FCC*
I. Introduction
During the past decade, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have been entangled in
controversy over whether the FCC should be required to hold evidentiary hear-
ings when a radio program format is changed. The dispute arises from the fact
that the airwaves are a public resource to be used for the benefit of all the peo-
ple of the United States.' To promote this end, the FCC has been charged with
the duty to protect the "public interest" in broadcasting, 2 which the District of
Columbia Circuit has interpreted to include an interest in diversity of program
formats. 3 In determining the best method to achieve this diversity, the court
and Commission have come into conflict. The FCC has insisted that eviden-
tiary hearings are not necessary since the public interest in diversity of formats
is adequately protected by free market forces. The court has held, however,
that if a significant sector of the listening public protests the loss of an
economically viable and unique format, an evidentiary hearing must be held to
determine if the format change would be in the public interest.
In WNCN Listeners Guild and Citizens Communications Center v. FCC (Listeners
Guild), 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reviewed an order of the Commission which, in spite of the court's previous
decisions, abolished a regulatory scheme in favor of a free market determina-
tion of formats. The court, sitting en banc, was put in the difficult position of
demonstrating both that their plan better protects the public interest and that
the decision was one which the judiciary, not the administrative agency, should
make. In deciding to affirm their own plan, the court demonstrated a disregard
for the facts of this case as well as for the limits of judicial authority.
* 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3568 (1980) (No. 79-824).
1 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
2 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976) provides in relevant part: "[T]he Commission shall determine, in the case
of each application filed with it... , whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served
by the granting of such application ......
3 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Citizens Comm. to
Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens Comm. to Preserve the Voice
of Arts in Atlanta v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
4 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3568 (1980) (No. 79-824).
II. Statement of Facts
A. The Petition to Deny
The Listeners Guild fact pattern is substantially identical to the previous for-
mat cases. 5 The prior cases arose from the sale of a radio station6 with the
owner seeking approval from the Commission to assign the broadcast license to
the new owner.7 When the new owner proposed a change in the program for-
mat of the station, a citizens' group organized to prevent the assignment and
thereby protect the previous format. The citizens' group filed a petition to
deny,8 seeking a hearing before the FCC to determine if the proposed format
change would be in the public interest. 9 In the past, the Commission has, in
every instance, denied these requests and granted the assignment of the
license, relying on the "invisible hand" of the free market to insure program
diversity. From the Commission's denial, the petitioners' only remaining op-
tion was an appeal to the circuit court.10
B. History of the Format Decisions
A body of law on broadcasting, as well as a substantial conflict between
the court and Commission, has developed from the appeals of these cases. In
the first modern format case, Citizens Committee to Preserve the Voice of Arts in
Atlanta v. FCC, II the court ruled that the petitioners, Atlanta citizens organized
to save a classical format, had raised substantial and material questions of fact
and were entitled to a hearing before the Commission. No hearing was held,
however, because the parties settled the matter among themselves.1 2 Three
years later in Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 13 and Lakewood
5 See note 3 supra. See also Lakewood Broadcasting Serv. Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Hartford Communications Comm'n v. FCC, 467 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The format cases are discussed in the following materials: Note, Program Diversity in the Broadcast Media,
17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 25 (1975); Note, Development of New Public Interest Standards, the Format Change
Cases, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 364 (1976); Note, Federal Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 28 RUTGERS L. REV.
966 (1975); Note, Listener's Rights: Public Intervention in Radio Format Changes, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 714
(1975); Note, Developing Standards-for Diversification of Broadcasting Formats, 52 Tax. L. REV. 558 (1974); Com-
ment, 9 GA. L. REV. 479 (1975).
6 A discussion of the legal problems encountered in buying a radio station is presented in Rubiner,
Primer for Purchase of a Radio Station, 53 MICH. ST. B.J. 398 (1974).
7 Assignments or transfers which involve substantial changes in ownership or control of the broad-
casting license are subject to the same standards and treated in the same manner as the initial application.
47 U.S.C. S 310(b) (1976).
8 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1976) provides in relevant part:
Any party in interest may file with the Commission a petition to deny any application
(whether as originally filed or as amended) .... The petitioner shall serve a copy of such petition
on the applicant. The petition shall contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that the
petitioner is a party in interest and that a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsis-
tent with subsection (a) of this section. Such allegation of fact shall, except for those of whifh of-
ficial notice may be taken, be supported by affidavit of a person or persons with personal
knowledge thereof. The applicant shall be given the opportunity to file a reply in which allega-
tions of fact or denials thereof shall similarly be supported by affidavit.
9 See note 2 supra.
10 Appeals from Commission decisions to deny or grant a station license must be taken to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1), (b)(6) (1976).
11 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
12 610 F.2d at 848. The assignment of the license was later granted by the FCC. Strauss Broadcasting,
31 FCC2d 550 (1971).
13 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. FCC, ' 4 the court had the opportunity to review the.
Commission's handling of the Voice of Arts decision. The court found that the
Commission's actions indicated a policy of limiting the precedential effect of
that decision to such an extent that it would apply only to cases involving
classical music stations in the Atlanta area."' Although deferring to the "exper-
tise" of the FCC to establish needed administrative standards, 1 6 the court
made clear that when public grumbling reaches significant proportions and
issues of fact are in dispute, the format change becomes an issue requiring a
hearing. The failure to hold this hearing or to render a reasoned decision in it
was declared to be reversible error.
17
The FCC, however, was not dissuaded from its position. Avoiding what it
labeled an administrative nightmare,' 8 the Commission continued to deny the
required hearings. It reasserted that abandonment of a non-unique format is
not a matter affecting the public interest, but rather is a business judgment
within the licensee's discretion.19 Thus, a broadcaster's choice of format would
not be questioned.
Faced with a regulatory agency which was reluctant to implement its deci-
sion, the circuit court of appeals sat en banc in Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v.
FCC (WEFM).20 After reasserting that the FCC was required to hold these
hearings, the majority explained that the Commission was not free to pursue a
policy of free competition if it was to fulfill its statutory duty of protecting the
public interest.
2 1
The Commission, upon receiving the remanded WEFM case, however,
continued their policy of denying hearings. At the same time, they undertook a
staff study of the problem and solicited public opinion on whether the required
regulatory scheme was wise public "policy.'"22 This effort resulted in the is-
suance of a Memorandum Opinion and Order 23 repudiating WEFM on four
principal grounds. First, the Commission found that WEFM imposed "com-
mon carrier-like" obligations on a broadcaster in spite of the congressional in-
tent that there be free competition in broadcasting. Second, the FCC found
that free market competition was highly effective in providing format diversity.
Third, the FCC felt that implementation of WEFM would be too burdensome a
task. Finally, the Commission feared that WEFM would "chill" a
broadcaster's choice of format and, therefore, improperly invade first amend-
ment rights.
The enforcement of the FCC order was not to become effective until the
final disposition of any judicial review. 24 In Listeners Guild, the court again sat
en banc to review their WEFM decision in light or-the new FCC challenge.
14 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
15 478 F.2d at 930.
16 478 F.2d at 925 n.14.
17 478 F.2d at 934.
18 Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 FCC2d 858, 865 (1976).
19 Zenith Radio Corp., 38 FCC2d 838, 845-46 (1972).
20 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
21 Id. at 267.
22 Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 57 FCC2d 580, 585 (1976).
23 60 FCC2d 858 (1976).
24 Id. at 866.
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III. The Rationale of Listeners Guild
A. The Plan Established by the Court in the Format Cases
The plan which the court reviewed in Listeners Guild was premised on the
court's finding that the public has an interest in format diversity. 25 Pursuant to
the Commission's duty to protect the public interest,2 6 the FCC must insure
that license assignments do not improperly interfere with format diversity. The
court has repeatedly stated that when a public interest issue arises and substan-
tial and material questions of fact exist, the FCC must hold an evidentiary
hearing to decide if the assignment is in the public interest.
27
No hearing is required when conditions exist which indicate that no public
interest issue arises. Four such conditions have been enumerated by the court:
(1) when the public does not protest the assignment of the license;28 (2) when
the protesting group is less than a "significant sector of the community"; 2 9 (3)
when there is an adequate substitute for the changed format;3 0 or'(4) when the
old format is not economically feasible.
3 '
B. The Court's Answers to the Commission's Challenge
The court, when challenged by the FCC, defended its regulatory design
by first listing and then answering the FCC's four objections to the rules
established in the format cases.3 2 Responding to the charge of imposing com-
mon carrier-like obligations on broadcasters, the court emphasized the nar-
rowness of their decision. Noting that WEFM would require a hearing only
when there was already evidence that the market had failed, the court stated
that their rules were not an imposition of a full regulatory scheme on broad-
25 See note 3 supra.
26 See note 2 supra.
27 See note 3 supra.
28 The "public" whose interest is considered in a format change is the public in that service area, which
can include more than just the city of license. 506 F.2d at 263. This does not, however, include members of
the public in an area which receives a distant station due to unusual circumstances or physical phenomena.
Id. at 263 n. 23.
The use of public response as a measure of the public interest is criticized in Volner, Broadcast Regula-
lion: Is There Too Much "Public" in the Public Interest?, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 267 (1974).
29 The District of Columbia Circuit has cautioned that each situation is different and, therefore, no
quantitative minimum as to what constitutes a significant minority should be established. 478 F.2d at 929
n.7. Examples of what the court considers significant, however, do exist.
In Citizens Committee to Preserve the Voice ofArts in Atlanta o. FCC, the court ruled that 16% of the listeners
in a service area with 20 stations constituted a significant sector of the community. 436 F.2d at 269. When
11,000 signatures on a petition to save a Toledo, Ohio, station were presented, the court found that this was
a significant minority. 478 F.2d at 928. In WEFM, the FCC received "over one thousand" letters of protest
from a service area of 7,500,000. The court found that this was a significant minority. 506 F.2d at 254, 268.
30 In WEFM, the court considered whether a station which reached 20% of the disputed format's
listeners was an adequate substitute. 506 F.2d at 263 n. 22. The court concluded:
In considering the availability vel non of an alternative source for a particular format, reliance
on an alternative that reaches less than a substantial portion ofthe area served by the station to be
assigned gives disproportionate weight to the interests of one portion of the public, and none at all
to those of another. Unless the Commission has considered this effect, and reasonably deter-
mined that the overall public interest is, on balance, better served by this arrangement, we can-
not say that it has discharged its obligation to assess and act in the public interest.
Id. at 263-64.
31 It is not sufficient justification for approving the application when the assignor merely asserts finan-
cial loss from operation of the station. The losses must be attributable to the format itself. Id. at 262.
32 610 F.2d at 844-54. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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casters, but merely a strictly limited protection of the public.3 3 Beyond this, the
court stressed that the Commission has limited remedial powers to deal with
the format change. Because the FCC has no authorization either to impose a
new format or to force retention of the old, it may view format diversity as only
one consideration in the decision of whether to allow the assignment of a
license. Thus, the court concluded that only through stretching WEFM beyond
recognition could it be said that common carrier obligations were being im-
posed.
34
Second, the FCC alleged their staff study had shown free competition to
provide an "almost bewildering array" of formats35, while imposed regulation
would deter innovative programming. 36 The court's answer to this charge was
not to deny the findings of the study, but rather to attack its impartiality.
Because of the Commission's failure to release the study prior to the decision,
the court believed the accuracy of the study was questionable. Furthermore, it
found the failure to release the study and allow public comment may have
violated procedural fairness to the opposing parties. The study was thus
dismissed without any of its findings being refuted.
The court then addressed the Commission's allegation that implementing
WEFM would create an "administrative nightmare.' 7 The majority conclud-
ed, after considering the history of format protest, that the Commission's
" 'administrative nightmare' turned out to be little more than a dream." '3 8
The perceived burdens of cost and time required for an evidentiary hearing
were shown to be exaggerated since in the previous ten years only one format
case had resulted in a hearing.3 9 Additionally, the court found that the inherent
limitations of WEFM would restrict the purported burdens which the FCC
would have to endure. This decision required a hearing only when substantial
questions of material fact existed concerning a commercially feasible, unique
format whose loss was protested by a significant minority. 40 Given these
restrictions,4 1 only a small number of cases would ever require a hearing, 42 and
although the administrative burdens in these cases were not to be minimized,
33 Id. at 856.
34 Id. at 851-52.
35 60 FCC2d at 863.
36 Id. at 865.
37 610 F.2d at 847-49.
38 Id. at 848.
39 WEFM resulted in a hearing in which the license was granted to the assignee. Zenith Radio Corp.,
60 FCC2d 1109 (1976) (notation of Commission action). The Citizens Committee considered an appeal, but
reached a settlement under which the assignee would donate WEFM's classical records to one classical sta-
tion and donate equipment as well as underwrite a classical show on another. Further, the assignee paid
$60,000 to the Citizens Committee for their legal expenses. Variety, Nov. 9, 1977, at 35, col. 3. The FCC
approved this agreement. [19781 42 RAn. REG. (P & F) 468.
The use and benefits of private agreements to settle format controversy are discussed at 52 TEx. L.
REv., supra note 5, at 555-69.
40 506 F.2d at 260; 478 F.2d at 929, 934; 436 F.2d at 269, 271-72.
41 The majority also suggested that the FCC might further restrict the intrusiveness of WEFM.
Specifically, the court stated that the Commission could set more rigorous standards for the establishment of
a prima facie case by requiring high levels of public grumbling or establishing broad format classifications.
610 F.2d at 854.
42 Counsel for the FCC estimated that only six petitions to deny based on format changes were pending
at the time Listeners Guild was being heard by the circuit court. The court speculated that few, ifany, of these
would result in a hearing. Id. at 849.
For a discussion of the reasons why so many petitions to deny are dismissed without a hearing, see
Note, Judicial Review of FCC Program Diversity Regulation, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 401, 406-07 (1975).
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neither should they be exaggerated. The "frenzied rhetorical excess" 43 with
which the Commission made its argument, and its subsequent admission at
oral argument that this characterization was exaggerated, resulted in the court
viewing the staff study and its conclusions with "considerable suspicion.'
'4 4
The final problem which the Commission anticipated WEFM would
create concerned the sensitive first amendment implications which broad-
casting regulation invokes. Answering this problem, the court simply noted
that the Commission is allowed to develop rigorous standards for the establish-
ment of a prima facie case for a petition to deny. The FCC, through the
development of these standards, can limit any possible intrusiveness caused by
WEFM. The court, however, cautioned that this did not suggest the Commis-
sion would be allowed to formulate policies which would render WEFM inef-
fective. It would still be the Commission's duty to protect the public interest in
format diversity in those infrequent situations where the free market had failed.
C. Implementing the Decision
Having explained its reasoning behind the reaffirmation of WEFM, the
court faced the more difficult problem: forcing the uncooperative Commission
to implement its decision. Past attempts to achieve this end had met with little
success. In one earlier format case, the court ordered the Commission to hold
the evidentiary hearings, and stated that "[n]o more [will be] required, no less
[will be] accepted." 45 Despite this warning, the FCC still did not hold the re-
quired hearings, a decision which resulted in the court spending a significant
portion of the WEFM opinion to emphasize that "there is no longer any room
for doubt that, if the FCC is to pursue the public interest, it may not be able at
the same time to pursue a policy of free competition.' '46 The FCC, however,
did not find this conclusion to be as clear as the court had thought. Instead, the
Commission issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order47 challenging the
court's regulatory program. The net result of this conflict between court and
agency was that the Commission had yet to hold, through its own initiative, an
evidentiary hearing on diversity.
In Listeners Guild, the court used a more direct approach to insure im-
plementation of its decision. Recognizing that the Commission's disagreement
stemmed from what the FCC saw as opposing policy viewpoints, the court
declared that their decision was not one of policy, but, as a statutory interpreta-
tion of the Communications Act, 48 was the law. 49 It was, therefore, the court
concluded, within the judiciary's constitutional authority to decide the case.
5 0
Regardless of the relative merits of free competition, as opposed to limited
43 610 F.2d at 849.
44 Id.
45 Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d at 934.
46 506 F.2d at 267.
47 Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 FCC2d 858 (1976).
48 47 U.S.C. S§ 151-609 (1976).
49 610 F.2d at 854. Authority which finds it equally clear that this judgment is a type which Congress
has entrusted to the FCC is presented in Tannenwald & Auchenthaler, Changes in Radio Entertainment Formats,
8 ST. Louis U. L.J. 358, 365 (1977).
50 SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978).
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regulation, the FCC is obligated to follow the judicial interpretation of the
Communications Act. Thus, the court has attempted to leave the FCC without
a means by which it can further delay implementation of WEFM. No longer
can the FCC treat the matter as a policy disagreement; the Commission must
now either implement the court's ruling in good faith, thus fulfilling its
statutory duty, or show that the judicial action was an infringement on the
Commission's constitutional authority to make radio policy.
IV. Critique
In discussing the Listeners Guild decision it is necessary to approach the
court's action in two ways. First, it must be determined if the court's conclu-
sion to affirm their regulatory scheme was justified by the facts. Second, the
procedure which the court followed in imposing this plan on the Commission
must be considered to determine if it was a proper exercise of judicial power.
A. Substantive Analysis of the Court's Action
In weighing the relative merits of the court's and the Commission's plans,
it is necessary to view them in light of the market on which they will be im-
posed. Radio broadcasting does not have, as the FCC concedes, 51 a perfect
market, a result to be expected when advertisers and not the public pay the
broadcaster. Consequently, the radio market is more likely to reflect the de-
mand for jeans, soft drinks, and acne lotions than the actual format preferences
of the listening public. Regulation could be imposed to correct this situation,
but the desirability of regulation must be balanced against the difficulties and
hazards associated with regulatory control.
The Commission found four major problems with regulation. 52 The court
attempted to respond to these by showing that the WEFM plan was neither too
burdensome nor intrusive on the administrator or the broadcaster. In doing so,
the court adequately demonstrated that their plan did impose "common
carrier-like" obligations.5 3 In light of the small number of cases which have
raised the diversity question, 54 the restrictions placed on the use of a hearing,
55
and the limited sanctions which the FCC can impose,56 the burden imposed on
the broadcaster was confined to that which is necessary to insure protection of
the public interest.
In contrast to the explanation on the limits of WEFM, the court gave a
superficial treatment to the important first amendment question. The majority
merely stated that they found no constitutional impediment to their decision,
and if one did exist, that the Commission is capable of adopting stringent
51 60 FCC2d at 863.
52 Id. at 865. See also text accompanying note 23 supra.
53 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
54 See note 42 supra.
55 See text accompanying note 40 supra. See also note 41 supra.
56 See text accompanying note 34 supra. See also 47 U.S.C. 5 326 (1976), which provides in relevant part:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power
of censorship over the radio communications . . . and no regulation or condition shall be pro-
mulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means
of radio communication.
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prima facie case requirements to limit any intrusiveness. 57 Although this ap-
proach to such a sensitive area of the law may seem unacceptable, it is reassur-
ing to note that the Commission's contentions concerning the intrusiveness of
WEFM were exaggerated. Under the court's ruling, the Commission may,
when a petition to deny is filed, review the diversity of formats in the relevant
broadcast area and thereafter deny the assignment of a license only when a par-
ticular format would otherwise be erased from that area. This process-fosters
diversity among the limited number of stations in a broadcast area; it does not
authorize consideration of content beyond its uniqueness to that broadcast
area. When uniqueness in an area is the subject of the inquiry, FCC authoriza-
tion extends only to preserve the present variety. WEFM does not allow the
FCC to compel change in an existing format. Further, WEFM does not alter
the existing requirement that the FCC may not consider the political,
economic, or social views of any applicant. 58 Since a decision must be made as
to which applicant among many potential broadcasters will be allowed to
utilize the scarce resource 5 9 WEFM provides a method intended to allow as
many different types of speech to reach the public as is practical. 60 Thus,
although the majority did not discuss the first amendment problem, it appears
that the court's conclusion was sound.
Of the four areas in which the FCC anticipated problems three have been
shown to be harmless, but the fourth, the staff study, remains. This study
demonstrated that free competition alone would do a better job of providing
format diversity than WEFM could do. This problem differed from the others
in that it did not question the feasibility of the court's plan, but instead ad-
dressed its wisdom. To have adequately answered this question, the court
would had to have demonstrated that their plan was not inferior to free com-
petition. Unfortunately, the court did not and could not satisfactorily supply an
57 See note 41 supra.
58 Johnson Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 359 (1949).
59 Whether radio stations will long remain scarce resources is a question which Judge Bazelon has ad-
dressed in concurring opinions in both Listeners Guild and, as ChiefJudge, in WEFM. The judge sees solving
the scarcity problem as one way of eliminating the format diversity problem. 610 F.2d at 859 (Bazelon,J.,
concurring); 506 F.2d at 274 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). But see Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment,
52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 157-63 (1967), in which the author states that radio stations are already less scarce
than daily newspapers, yet are subject to more regulation. Concluding that any barriers are economic, not
technical, and that the situation is, therefore, similar to newspaper ownership, the author argues for less
regulation of broadcasting.
One author's explanation for the difference in degree of regulation between broadcasters and
newspaper owners is presented in Bolinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 36 (1976).
An indication of the advances in telecommunications technology which might make the judge's solu-
tion become a reality is presented in Baer, Telecommunications Technology in the 1980's, in COMMUNICATIONS
FOR TOMORROW POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980's 61 (G. Robinson ed. 1978). The effect technology may
have on program diversity is discussed in Lucas, Telecommunication Technologies and Services, in COMMUNicA-
TIONS FOR TOMORROW POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980's 245, 256-59 (G. Robinson ed. 1978).
60 In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969), the Supreme Court stated:
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are fre-
quencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast com-
parable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.
... No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to
deny a station license because "the public interest" requires it "is not a denial of free speech."
In the same case, the court referred to a past decision in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943),
and concluded that this decision "unequivocally recogniz[ed] that the Commission was more than a traffic
policeman concerned with the technical aspects of broadcasting and that it neither exceeded its powers
under the statute nor transgressed the First Amendment in interesting itself in general program format and
the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees." 395 U.S. at 395.
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answer to this problem. The Commission's findings were tainted by the failure
to release the study prior to reaching a decision. Thus, the court found that it
did not have fair and impartial facts on which to base a decision.
Having spent considerable effort in showing the WEFM plan to be feasi-
ble, the court was unable to resolve the issue of which approach would better
protect the public interest. The proper response to this difficulty should have
been to remand the case for public comment on the study and thereby remove
any taint. 61 In this way, the public would have had the opportunity to comment
on which plan was preferable, and the court would have been presented with a
study indicating which plan best served the public interest. The court,
however, reaffirmed its own plan and concluded, without proof, that the
WEFM plan did a better job of protecting the diversity interest than free com-
petition.
B. Procedural Analysis of the Court's Action
Although the court's plan could conceivably provide better protection of
the public interest than could the free market alone, the question remains as to
whether the court overstepped judicial bounds by imposing their solution on
the FCC. To answer this question, it must be determined whether the court's
action was an interpretation of the Communications Act, or whether it was a
policy determination to be made by the Commission under the power which
Congress has delegated to them.
For nearly a decade, the Commission has concentrated its efforts on con-
testing which plan would better serve the public interest, a policy determina-
tion with which the Commission is familiar. In the Memorandum Opinion and
Order,6 2 which challenged WEFM, the FCC continued to address the problem
as one of policy. Yet, if this decision is purely a policy determination, as the
FCC has treated it, then the court has neither the expertise nor the constitu-
tional authority to make the determination.
63
The court, until Listeners Guild, had avoided making an affirmative
declaration that their action was based on an interpretation of the Communica-
tions Act. Despite the inaction of the Commission in implementing WEFM,
the court had preferred simply to demand that less than full compliance with
their decision would not be accepted. In Listeners Guild, the court bluntly stated,
without presenting their reasoning, that their action was based on an inter-
pretation of the Communications Act.
The reason for the court's reluctance in taking this step becomes clear
upon reviewing their handling of section 309 of the Communications Act.
64
Subsection (a) of this section contains the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity" clause, which the court established as including an interest in for-
61 See 610 F.2d at 858 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
62 60 FCC2d 858 (1976).
63 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 793-94 (1978); Citizens
Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d at 267-68; Marsh v. FCC, 436 F.2d 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
64 47 U.S.C. S 309 (1976).
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mat diversity. 65 This action was clearly justifiable as an interpretation of the
legislative meaning behind the term "public interest. 66
Having established the basic premise, the court then addressed section
309(d)(2) of the Act, 67 which sets forth the standard for the necessity of a hear-
ing. This subsection requires a hearing when the Commission cannot deter-
mine if the assignment of the license would be in the public interest or if
substantial and material questions of fact exist. The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in applying the rule in format cases, however, has interpreted this as
meaning that even when substantial and material questions of fact do exist, a
hearing is unnecessary if no public interest issue arises. 68 This interpretation,
although by no means clear from a literal reading of the statute, is in keeping
with the apparent congressional intent of insuring that the public interest is
protected. Thus, one thrust of the format decisions is that section 309(d)(2) re-
quires a hearing only when it is not clear whether an assignment of the license
would be in the public interest.
The Commission has accepted these definitions of the Communications
Act and has attempted to formulate a policy in accordance with them. In
65 See note 3 supra.
66 Diversity of programming, through diversity of ownership, had previously been recognized as an ele-
ment of the public interest. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 394-95. The Supreme
Court approvingly stated in this case that the Commission, in applying the public interest standard, has for
40 years been choosing licensees based, in part, on their program proposals. Moreover, the Court noted that
the public interest standard was an instrument to effect the congressional desire to allay fears of monopolistic
control of broadcasting, and, therefore, the Commission could involve itself with program formats. Id.
67 47 U.S.C. S 309(d)(2) (1976) provides:
If the Commission finds on the basis of the application, the pleadings filed, or other matters
which it may officially notice that there are no substantial and material questions of fact and that
a grant of the application-would be consistent with subsection (a) of this section, it shall make the
grant, deny the petition, and issue a concise statement of the reasons for denying the petition,
which statement shall dispose of all substantial issues raised by the petition. If a substantial and
material question of fact is presented or if the Commission for any reason is unable to find that
grant of the application would be consistent with subsection (a) of this section, it shall proceed as
provided in subsection (e) of this section.
68 WEFM was the first case in which the second situation, the public interest, was raised as cause for a
hearing. 506 F.2d at 259. The District of Columbia Circuit noted that the two grounds for hearings are "in-
timately related" in format change cases. Id. Indeed, while the court has recognized the two separate routes
to an evidentiary hearing, they have, in format cases, effectively changed the two separate routes into two
requirements necessary before a hearing will be held. This can be best understood by observing that peti-
tions to deny can be placed in one of three categories.
In the first category, the petition raises substantial and material questions of fact which concern the public
interest. In these cases the court has ruled that an evidentiary hearing is required. See 610 F.2d at 843; 506
F.2d at 262.
In the second category, there is no public interest concern, but substantial and material questions of
fact otherwise exist. While a literal reading of 5 309(d)(2) indicates that a hearing is required in these in-
stances, the court has held that no hearing is necessary. In Listeners Guild, the court stated that even when the
record presents substantial fact issues, a hearing is unnecessary if the facts show that no public interest issue
exists. 610 F.2d at 843.
In the third category, public interest issues exist but there are no substantial and material questions of
fact. In these cases, it would appear logical that no hearing is necessary since there are no material questions
of fact to be resolved. This position seems to have been adopted by the circuit court. See 610 F.2d at 843; 478
F.2d at 930-31. The best illustration of this category is Lakewood Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478
F.2d 919 (1973), in which the court found a public interest issue existed but no hearing was necessary since
no substantial and material questions of fact were present. Id. at 922-23. In Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM
v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (1974), however, the court hinted that less than substantial questions of fact may be
sufficient to trigger the hearing requirement. A mere need for more information may be -enough to
necessitate a hearing. Id. at 259, 262.
Although the District of Columbia Circuit has not definitively stated when 5 309 requires a hearing on
format diversity, the rule which they appear to be utilizing was stated in a nonformat case. "Only where the
public interest cannot be determined without a resolution of disputedfacts has Congress dictated that the Com-
mission must conduct a hearing. That is the clear meaning of section 309 of the Act." Marsh v. FCC, 436
F.2d at 136 (emphasis added). It seems, therefore, that the District of Columbia Circuit will require eviden-
tiary hearings only when substantial and material questions concerning a public interest issue exist.
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establishing this policy, the FCC must consider not only these interpretations,
but also other established "public interest" considerations. Included among
these other considerations is the interest in free competition among broad-
casters. 69 Attempting to carry out their mandate, the FCC conducted a study
which concluded that diversity could be protected through free competition.
The Commission, therefore, determined that a hearing would never be
necessary to protect the public interest in diversity. Both the interest in free
competition and the diversity interest could be adequately protected by normal
market forces. If other public interest issues were in doubt, however, the Com-
mission would still hold a hearing.
The FCC had found, in effect, that the public interest is not adversely af-
fected by format changes because, in these situations, the public interest is pro-
tected by other means. In keeping with the court's interpretation of section
309(d)(2), 70 this would indicate that the Communications Act does not require
hearings on format diversity. 71 Moreover, the court admitted that the Commis-
sion's plan did an adequate job of protecting diversity. 72 Thus, the Commis-
sion's plan was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 73 Since the
FCC policy was within the judicial guidelines, the court should have been con-
sistent with its previous interpretations of the Communications Act, and
upheld the Commission's judgment. By overruling the FCC plan in favor of a
plan which they feel does a better job of protecting the diversity interest, the
court has usurped the policy-making role of the Commission.
7 4
The court has chosen Listeners Guild to be the case in which they declare
their action to be a statutory interpretation, thus precluding the FCC from fur-
ther attacking the merits of WEFM. The clarity with which the court states that
their action is law, however, does not alter the fact that it is beyond the court's
authority to dictate the policy by which the FCC must achieve its ends.
69 Metropolitan Television Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
70 See note 67 supra. See also note 68 supra.
71 This judgment, that the public interest is already being served, is within the power of the Commis-
sion to make. "[Ilt is the Commission, not the courts, which must be satisfied that the public interest will be
served." FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946). See also Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d 841, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
72 610 F.2d at 851.
73 The Administrative Procedure Act allows a reviewing court to invalidate a regulation of an ad-
ministrative agency if it is unreasonable or not based on a consideration of the relevant factors. FCC v. Na-
tional Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 790-92.
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), provides in relevant part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law
74 In FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 793, the Supreme Court stated
that "it is now well established that this general rulemaking authority supplies a statutory basis for the Com-
mission to enact regulations codifying its view of the public interest licensing standard, so long as that view
is based on consideration of permissible factors and is otherwise reasonable." The courts' inquiry into these
rules should be searching and careful, but the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Id. at 803, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
See also Tannenwald & Auchenthaler, supra note 49, at 365, in which the authors review Listeners Guild
before a decision was made by the circuit court, and conclude that the Commission's policy should be af-




The WEFM plan of limited regulation to promote the public interest in
diversity may be a better proposal than the free market policy which the Com-
mission advocates. This issue should have been decided by a fair, impartial
study conducted by the FCC. The Commission had the opportunity to conduct
this study, but tainted its findings by its obvious distaste for WEFM. The
court's response to this impartiality was equally improper. If a fair decision was
to have been reached in Listeners Guild, the case should have been remanded for
a determination of which plan would better protect the public interest.
The more serious problem in Listeners Guild is that the court should never
have been involved in making this decision. The District of Columbia Circuit
Court should have exercised proper judicial restraint in its dealings with the
FCC, 75 thereby avoiding this protracted dispute between the court and
agency.76
Daniel T. Sherlock
75 The Supreme Court has cautioned the District of Columbia Circuit many times in regard to
overstepping judicial bounds, most notably in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543-49 (1978). The District of Columbia Circuit, however, has
been reluctant to loosen its grip on the agencies. "[The District of Columbia Circuit] has countermanded
the Federal Communications Commission so often that even top FCC laiNyers concede that the agency com-
monly surrenders its decision-making duties to the D.C. judges." NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1979, at 99.
76 There has been much effort in Congress to reform the Communications Act. Some of the proposed
bills would make moot the problems addressed in Listeners Guild. See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 125
CONo. REC. H1853 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1979) (abolishing the FCC and immediately deregulating radio
broadcasting); S. 622, 96th Conig., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S2525 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1979) (prohibiting
the FCC from requiring a licensee to adhere to a particular format); S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. S2501 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1979) (allowing licensees to hold licenses for indefinite periods).
The House Communications Subcommittee, however, due to a lack of consensus among its members,
has abandoned present plans for a rewrite of the Communications Act. 48 U.S.L.W. 2067 (1979). The
Carter administration, meanwhile, has announced that passage of regulatory reform legislation for the com-
munications area, including improvement in the way frequencies are assigned, is a high priority. 48
U.S.L.W. 2498 (1980).
A critique of the various reform bills is presented in Note, The Proposed Communications Act Rewrite:
Potomac Deregulato~y Fever v. The Public Interest, 48 U. CN. L. REv. 476 (1979).
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